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While law professors are increasingly making use of data in
their scholarship and while the data work housed in their studies is
(generally) of a high quality, they have been less effective at
communicating the products of their labor. A strong devotion to
tabular, rather than graphical, displays, and claims about
"statistical significance" rather than substantive importance, are
just two areas requiringimprovement.
Here, as in Part I, we attempt to adapt a burgeoning
literature in the social and statisticalsciences to the unique interests
of legal scholars. Our proposals are many in number, but none is
particularlydifficult to implement. More to the point, we believe that
law professors should want to implement them. If other fields are
any indication, moving toward more appropriate and accessible
presentations of data will heighten the impact of empirical legal
scholarship regardless of the audience-no doubt a desirablegoal in
a discipline that rightfully prides itself on its contributions to
forming legal and public policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

To assess the controversial claim that affirmative action in
U.S. law schools causes blacks to fail the bar exam, Daniel E. Ho
deploys an innovative approach. 1 Professor Ho "matches" students on
all relevant observable variables, 2 except the key causal variable-the
tier of their law school-and then compares bar passage rates. Figure
1, reprinted from Ho's article, displays the results.
Estimated causal effect on
probability of passing bar
of attending:

White students

First tier versus second tier
Second tier versus third tier

Black students

(n 361)

(n 48

(a =
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Fifth tier versus HBCU

(n 546)
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-0,2
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0.0

0.2
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((n
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29

-0.2
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Figure 1: Daniel E. Ho's estimated causal effects on the probability of passing the bar for
white and black students after attending different tiers of law schools. The horizontal
lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All but one of these lines intersects with zero,
3
indicating that the impact of school tier is not statistically significant.

1.
Daniel E. Ho, Scholarship Comment, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black
Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005), Ho is responding to the controversial claims
in Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57
STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).
2.
These observable variables include race, gender, LSAT score, and undergraduate GPA.
Ho, supra note 1, at 1999.
3.
The figure appeared in Ho's work. Id. Ho utilizes data from Sander, supra note 1.
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Ho's work has received no shortage of kudos, 4 but surely
another is in order: the author knows how to communicate research
results. From Figure 1, readers can easily grasp the study's key
takeaway; namely, claims about the repercussions of affirmation
action on bar passage rates are overblown. Similarly qualified black
students, regardless of the tier of their law school, perform at the
same (i.e., statistically indistinguishable) level.
Why Ho's graphic display is so powerful and, indeed, why it
may help explain the impact of his article, is no mystery. First, while
assessing the effect of school tier on bar performance required complex
calculations, Ho deemphasizes them; 5 he instead focuses on
communicating substance, not statistics. No one can look at Ho's
figure and fail to see that all but one of the black circles and lines fall
near zero (indicating no causal effect). Second, not only does the
author well illustrate the substantive effect of school tier on bar
passage rates, he also effectively conveys his uncertainty about that
(non)effect. Because the dark horizontal lines (indicating 95%
confidence intervals) intersect zero for all black students, we can
safely conclude that the impact of tier is statistically indistinct from
zero. A presentation depicting only the results and not Ho's
uncertainty about them may well have led causal readers astray,
especially about black students in the lowest tiers. Finally, we
applaud Ho's use of a figure to convey his findings. Had he employed a
tabular display, as do many scholars publishing in the law reviews, he
would have missed an opportunity to present his results in the most
accessible and powerful way possible.
In short, in conveying the findings of his important study, Ho
followed the three key principles of effective communication:
1. Communicate Substance, not Statistics
2. When Performing Inference, Convey Uncertainty
3. Graph Data and Results

See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Sanding Down Sander, SLATE, Apr. 29, 2005,
4.
http://www.slate.com/id/2117745/ ("The forthcoming responses to Sander pounce on several of his
moves (which they call causal inferences). To begin with, there is the problem of 'post-treatment
bias,' which means that it's a bad idea to control for a factor that is itself a consequence of the
cause you're studying. That no-no is explained by Daniel Ho..."); Vic Fleischer, On Changing
One's Mind, A TAXING BLOG, May 9, 2005, http://vic.typepad.com/taxingblog/2005/05/on-changing

_one.html ("Perhaps my initial agreement with Sander was in part out of an urge to defend him.
In any event, I've changed my mind. Dan Ho's presentation changed my mind. Ask yourselfwhen was the last time an empirical paper changed your mind about an issue like affirmative
action?").
5.
Ho, supra note 1, at 2002 n.25.
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Our earlier article, On the Effective Communication of the
Results of Empirical Studies, Part I (hereinafter Communication 1),6
explores these principles in some detail. It also offers some general
7
rules for creating visually effective displays of data.
In other disciplines, adherence to these principles has
generated benefits for the producers and consumers of empirical
research, and we have no doubt that Law will see similarly salutary
effects. Most crucially, as we explained in Communication I, moving
towards more appropriate and accessible data presentations will
enhance the impact of empirical legal scholarship-regardless of
whether the intended audience consists of other scholars, students,
policy makers, judges, or practicing attorneys.8 At the same time,
however, we realize that legal researchers require more than general
guidelines; on-the-ground guidance may prove even more valuable for
those who have carefully designed and executed their studies, and
now must convey the fruits of their labor to their colleagues in the
academy, to lay groups, or to both. Hence, in this second and final part
in our series, we aim to get far more specific, offering analysts advice
on how to translate their data (Part II) and results (Part III) into
powerful visual presentations.
In setting out the various strategies to follow, we adhere to the
general principles laid out in the earlier article, 9 but none more so
than the very basic idea that researchers should almost always graph
their data and results. Along these lines, we agree with Gelman and
his colleagues: Unless the author has a very compelling reason to
provide precise numbers to readers, a well-designed graph is a

6.
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811 (2006)
[hereinafter Communication1].
7.
To wit:
Aim for Clarity and Impact
Iterate
Write Detailed Captions
Id. at 1845.
8.
Id. at 1814; see also Gary King, Michael Tomz, & Jason Wittenburg, Making the Most of
Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SC. 347, 360
(2000) (arguing that such attention to interpretation and presentation "could help bridge the
acrimonious and regrettable chasm that often separates quantitative and nonquantitative
scholars, and make the fruits of statistical research accessible to all who have a substantive
interest in the issue under study"). Much of the inspiration for our series (especially infra Part
III) comes from this article.
9.
We also assume that readers of this piece have at least skimmed Communication I,
supra note 6. Accordingly, we do not reiterate, e.g., the basics of good graphic construction,
among other topics, here.
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superior choice to a table.1 0 To put it another way, with only limited
exceptions, we interpret the phrase "effective communication" in our
title to mean "effective graphical presentations."
Just one final note of introduction: to be sure, our primary
audience is the empirical legal scholar hoping to communicate her
research to academics and the public, but it is not only the empiricist
that we aim to reach. Because our goal here, as it was in
Communication I, is nothing short of establishing a new norm in the
presentation of empirical legal scholarship, we hope to enlist the
entire legal community in our project. This should not be a difficult, as
judges, policy makers, lawyers, academics, and students-the
consumers of data work-have as much to gain as the producers from
more insightful and accessible presentations. Nonetheless, to advance
our goal, as well as to reinforce the basic lessons of our series, we
supply, in Part IV, a set of guidelines for the communication and
evaluation of data and results. We direct these suggestions primarily
at those ideally situated to help elevate the quality of empirical
work-journal editors. But we also hope that these proposals will
prove valuable to others in the legal community who wish to become
more informed evaluators of the data work now flooding the law
reviews.
II. COMMUNICATING DATA
Scholars conducting empirical work generally seek to
communicate two features of their research: the data they have
collected and the results yielded by their analyses. If the researchers'
sole goal is describing the information they have collected, then only
the first, descriptions or summaries of the data, will come into play.
More typically though, summarizing data is merely a prelude to
drawing inferences, that is, to using observations the researcher has
collected-her sample-to generalize about observations she has not
collected-the population of interest.1 1 While some studies stop at
descriptive inference,1 2 most studies aim to make claims that are
causal in nature. For example, many studies deploy statistical
procedures (e.g. regression analysis) to determine whether one or
10. See generally Andrew Gelman et al., Let's Practice What We Preach: Turning Tables into
Graphs, 56 AM. STATISTICIAN 121 (2002). See also Communication I, supra note 6, at 1842-43
n.15.
11. For discussions of inference, see generally, e.g., Communication I, supra note 6; Lee
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
12. See Epstein & King, supra note 11, at 29 ("[Dlescriptive inferences are different than
data summaries. We do not make them by summarizing facts; we make them by using facts we
know to learn about facts we do not observe.")
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more factors lead to (or cause) a particular outcome. 13 When
conducting inferential analyses of these sorts, researchers will always
communicate the results their methods yield; they will also frequently
convey information about the data used in their procedures.
Daniel Schneider's analysis of the effect of appellate court
judges' background characteristics on their decisions in tax cases is
illustrative. 14 From social science theories of judging, Schneider
develops several empirical implications about the relationship
between background characteristics and outcomes; for example, he
predicts that female judges and judges who are new to the bench will
be more likely to rule in favor of taxpayers.
To assess these and other hypotheses, Professor Schneider
drew a random sample of 416 federal tax decisions issued in the U.S.
circuit courts between 1996-2000.15 These 416 cases (and, more
specifically, the 1295 judicial votes cast in them) were, in and of
themselves, of little interest to Schneider. Rather, his ultimate
objective was to use his sample to draw an inference about judging in
all tax cases-an objective he intended to realize by evaluating the
hypotheses of interest in multivariate statistical models. Nonetheless,
prior to presenting the results of his statistical estimation, Schneider
provided readers with information about the raw ingredients that
went into the analysis-that is, about the data he had collected. 16 We
learn, for example, that 82% of the 1295 votes were cast by male
judges and 18% by females; that the number of years of service on the
bench, on average, was twelve; and so on. 7
Schneider's strategy of conveying information about the data
he had collected, as well as the results of his statistical analysis is
quite typical; it is also, we might add, quite appropriate. For readers
to be able to evaluate the results of a statistical procedure, they
require information about the data that went into producing those
results.' 8 What is less appropriate, however, and even problematic, is

13. To be clear, causal inference is the difference between two descriptive inferences. More
specifically, a causal inference is the difference in the dependent variable between the situation
where the treatment is applied and the situation where the control is applied. Different
statistical models approach causal inference using varying modeling assumptions. See, e.g.,
Epstein & King, supra note 11, at 36.
14. Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins Federal
Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?, 25 VA. TAX REV. 201
(2005).
15. Id. at 211, 221.
16. Id. at 221.22.
17. For more on Schneider's data, see infra Table 1.
18. For more on this point, see, e.g., Communication I, supra note 6, at 1819-21; EDWARD R.
TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION 168 (2nd ed. 2001).
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the typical manner in which such information is presented. If our tour
through the law reviews, and even refereed legal journals, is any
indication, authors more often than not communicate features of their
data via tables, not figures; and when they do use figures, their
choices are not optimal either for them or their audience. How
scholars communicate the results of their analyses is even more
troublesome. Unlike Ho's article, 19 the authors' (usually tabular)
displays contain slews of estimated "coefficients" that are not only
meaningless to virtually all of their readers but to themselves as well.
Rarely do empirical legal researchers provide information about the
substantive effects of their results (Ho's recent article is the exception,
not the rule); and even more rarely do authors create a visual
representation of those effects in a form that readers can easily grasp.
In the sections to follow, we offer some correctives. Specifically,
in what directly follows in this Part we focus on communicating data;
in Part III, we take up the presentation of results. We divide the
material in this way because the presentation of data and of results
are somewhat different tasks and are governed, to some extent, by
distinct rules. 20 For example, as we discussed in Communicating I,
when performing inference, authors have an obligation to convey the
level of uncertainty about their results-as did Ho. 21 But when
researchers are merely displaying or describing the data they have
collected-and not using their sample to draw inferences about the
population that may have generated the data-supplying measures of
uncertainty, such as confidence intervals may be overkill. 22 On the
other hand, reflecting our view that, for the purpose of
communication, graphs are superior to tables, we generally focus both
discussions on visualization via pictures-meaning that all the
general principles we outlined in Communication I are operative
23
here.
With that cautionary note in mind, let us turn to the
presentation of data, specifically to prescriptions for effectively
visualizing (A) one variable and (B) the relationship between two or
more variables.

19. Ho, supra note 1.
20. As we emphasize throughout this Article, there are different rules for describing data
collected versus performing inference.
21. See Ho, supra note 1, at 2003 fig.1 (providing 95% confidence intervals for all estimated
effects).
22. See Communication I, supra note 6, at 1838 n.72 (noting Gelman's apparent
disagreement).
23. That is, whether presenting data or results, researchers must aim for clarity and
impact, employ iterative efforts to improve visualization and craft detailed captions. Id. at 1811.
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A. The One-Variable Case
The building blocks of most empirical analyses are variablesi.e., characteristics of some phenomenon that vary across instances of
the phenomenon. In Ho's study, for example, bar passage is a variable
that can take on one of two values: a student can pass or fail. In
Schneider's data set, seniority on the bench varies, from less than one
year to over forty. Gender, too, is among Schneider's variables: a judge
is either a male or a female. 24 For purposes of designing their research
projects, scholars tend to differentiate between dependent variablesthe outcomes or responses the researcher is trying to explain-and
independent variables-the factors that may help account for or
explain the outcome. In Schneider's analysis, for example, seniority on
the bench is an independent variable, which he expects to affect the
outcome of tax cases, the dependent variable.
When researchers go about the twin tasks of analyzing and
presenting data, another distinction between variables is equally
important: quantitative (or numerical) versus qualitative (or
categorical) variables. Schneider's study houses examples of both.
Because it is numerical, his seniority variable-"years on the bench"is quantitative. 25 To the extent that we can categorize judges with a
descriptor-whether they are male or female-or differentiate them
on the basis of this quality, gender is a qualitative and not
quantitative variable. Indeed, while we could assign the number "1" to
male judges and "2" to female judges, unless one believes that females
are twice as good as males, those numbers associated with each
26
category have no intrinsic meaning.
Any scholar who has performed inference understands the
distinction between quantitative and qualitative variables; it is
fundamental to selecting the appropriate statistical model for
analysis. 2 7 It is also crucial for selecting the appropriate tool for
purposes of presentation-so much so that we divide the material to
follow on this basis.
24. Schneider, supra note 14, at 213 n.36, 216 n.42.
25. Quantitative variables come in two varieties: those that can only take on a limited, or
finite, number of values are discrete; and those that can be any possible number are continuous.
See ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 16 (3d
ed. 1997).

26. Categorical variables can be ranked (e.g. interval and ordinal variables) or unranked
(e.g. nominal variables). See id.
27. As an illustration, if a dependent variable is quantitative, oftentimes a linear regression
model is appropriate. If, however, a dependent variable is dichotomous, a logistic regression
model would usually be appropriate. See J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL
AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997).
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1. Quantitative Variables: Eliminate Tables of Summary Statistics
In an interesting study of judgments awarding attorneys' fees
to the prevailing party, Michael Kao compares two continuous,
quantitative variables-the hourly rate awarded in thirteen state and
sixteen federal civil rights cases filed in California and terminated in
2000 or 2001.28 Kao expects to find lower fees awarded in the federal
cases but the data, he argues, reveal no meaningful differences
between the two court systems. To shore up his claim, Kao deploys
four different displays of the same data-two of which convey
information about the individual observations: a table containing raw
data and a univariate scatterplot (reproduced in Figure 2 below). The
next two, a table of descriptive (summary) statistics and a threedimensional bar chart, summarize the distribution of the data (see
Figure 3).
We admire Kao's desire to be thorough, but we are troubled by
his choices. Ironically enough, none of the four displays, taken
individually or collectively, clearly conveys the researcher's primary
message: that the structure of the two continuous variables (hourly
rates awarded in the state and federal courts) is virtually
indistinguishable.
Beginning with Kao's two attempts to convey each observation
(case) in his data set, the first-the raw data table-is not simply
unnecessary; it is distracting, even frustrating. While authors must
make their data sets publicly available, and the law journals ought to
ensure that they do, 2 9 analysts should avoid inserting them into the
text of an article. As a general matter, raw data tables waste precious
journal space and, worse still, they almost never serve the author's
purpose: Even after careful study, most readers will be unable to
discern patterns in Kao's state or federal cases, much less determine
whether the patterns are similar or not. We simply cannot keep that
many figures in our head, and the more observations in the study, the
30
worse the problem grows.

28.

Michael Kao, Comment, Calculating Lawyers' Fees: Theory and Reality, 51 UCLA L.

REV. 825, 838 (2004).

29.

For recommendations on this point, see discussion infra Part IV.

30.

See WILLIAM G. JACOBY, STATISTICAL GRAPHICS FOR UNIVARIATE AND BIVARIATE DATA

47 (1997) ("[Rlesearchers often have difficulty seeing the forest (i.e., a variable's distribution)
because of the trees that it contains (i.e., the individual observations).").
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Figure 2: Michael Kao's data on attorney fees awarded in state and federal court cases.
The panels on the top are partial reproductions of Kao's raw data on awarded fees. The
panel on the bottom is Kao's univariate scatterplot representing the variance of awards
in state and federal cases. The raw data tables make it difficult to decipher patterns,
while the univariate scatterplot fails to capture the overall distribution of the state and
federal awards.
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With these words, we do not mean to pick on Kao. He is hardly
the only law review author to violate the general principle of
jettisoning raw data tables. But in only a very limited number of
instances are those violations justifiable-chiefly, when the goal is to
provide interesting substantive information to the readers or to
facilitate the detection of the individual data points. 31 Kao's
observations meet neither of these conditions.
31. Illustrative is Guhan Subramanian's study, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race"Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1795 (2002), which sought to join the "race to the top/bottom" debate by exploring
whether managers migrate to states with anti-takeover statutes in place at the time of their
decision to incorporate. As part of his demonstration that "bottom" proponents have the better
argument, he presents and labels the measurements of a single continuous variable: the number
of companies incorporating in a number of states. Id. at 1815 fig.2. In the left panel of the figure
below we reproduce his display. Id.
Delaware

To

oet.-

0

Other
Maryland
New York

cawmia

.
0
0

Massachusetts
California
Nevada
Minnesota

9
0
0
0

Ohio

0

Pennsylvania
Florida

*

Texas
0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Incorporation State [%of Number of Companies]
Unlike Kao's inclination to provide information on and label each case in his study,
Subramanian's strikes us as entirely reasonable: the observations are small in number, familiar,
and of clear substantive interest to participants in the debate he seeks to engage. Moreover, for
all the reasons we discussed in Communication I, supra note 6, Subramanian shows good sense
in graphing the data rather than presenting it in tabular form, as did Kao.
On the other hand, and again for the reasons we offered in the earlier paper, we would draw
a line at his use of pie charts. These "pop" displays are never a good choice, and here the chart is
particularly problematic. Subramanian's figure obscures the data, making visualization
difficult-perhaps even more difficult than a tabular display. Subramanian, supra, at 1815 fig.2.
Far better for purposes of decoding, as Cleveland demonstrates, is the dot chart, located in the
right panel. See WILLIAM S. CLEVELAND, THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA 262-63 (2d ed. 1994)
("[With a dot plot we] can effortlessly see a number of properties of the data that are either not
apparent at all in the pie chart or that are just barely noticeable"); see also William S. Cleveland
& Robert McGill, Graphical Perception:. Theory, Experimentation, and Application to the
Development of Graphical Methods, 79 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 531, 545 (1984) ("A pie chart can
always be replaced by a bar chart ....
[But] we prefer dot charts .... ). Indeed, we strongly
recommend dot charts for those rather rare circumstances in which labeling the measurements
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Better, but only marginally so, is Kao's other attempt to
display his individual data points: the univariate scatter plot, which
represents each observation as a point across the range of the
variable(s) of interest. For Kao, as we can see in Figure 2, the
observations are federal and state court cases, and the variables of
interest are the hourly rates awarded in each.
Again, we applaud Kao's intuition here; namely, if the goal is to
enable readers to detect information about each measurement, a
univariate scatterplot can be an appropriate and valuable tool. The
problems here are twofold. First, assuming Kao's goal is detection, the
plot does not serve him well. Because of the relatively large number of
cases (at least for a univariate scatter), and because the hourly wages
for many are identical or nearly so, the individual data points are
obscured. Overplotting of this sort can be reduced through a technique
called jittering32 or even by using different plotting symbols but it is
difficult to eliminate entirely. Perhaps this explains why univariate
34
scatterplots3 3 are relatively rare.
This brings us to a second problem with Kao's presentation:
Like most researchers, Kao seems less interested in conveying the
trees of his study (i.e., hourly rates in particular state and federal
cases) than the forest (i.e. the distribution of hourly award rates by
court type). If this is the goal, then univariate scatterplots, to continue
the metaphor, can prevent readers from seeing the forest through the
trees. 35 From Kao's scatterplot we get a far better feel for the
relatively uninteresting individual observations than for the structure
of the variables of interest, not to mention the comparison he wishes
us to draw between them.
of a quantitative variable is desirable-that is, those circumstances presented by the
Subramanian's study: a manageable number of substantively interesting cases. For more on
these circumstances, see JACOBY, supra note 30, at 50 ("[D]ot plots are particularly suitable for
detection or for the ability to discern individual data points in the graph.").
32.

First developed in J.M. CHAMBERS ET AL., GRAPHICAL METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS

(1983) 20-21, jittering helps to separate points in a univariate scatterplot by adding (or
subtracting) a small amount to their value in order to set them off from other data points and
thus aid in visual inspection. See also CLEVELAND, supra note 31, at 158 (defining jittering as
"adding a small amount of random uniform noise to the data before graphing"); JACOBY, supra
note 30, at 31 (describing jittering as the process of "displacing the points somewhat in the
direction perpendicular to the variable's scale line"); Richard A. Becker & William S. Cleveland,
Brushing Scatterplots, 29 TECHNOMETRICS 127, 134 (1987) (explaining that jittering is used to
"alleviate overlap).
33. Bivariate scatterplots are a different matter altogether. See infra Part II.C for more on
the use of these plots.
34. See JACOBY, supra note 30, at 32 ("When the number of observations is large, there will
still be quite a bit of overplotting despite the jittering. Therefore, unidimensional scatterplots
remain primarily useful for small data sets.").
35. This metaphor is borrowed from Jacoby. Id. at 47, 50.
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Kao apparently appreciates the problem, and seeks to remedy
it with two additional displays (see Figure 3), neither of which conveys
much more information than the others. We need not say too much
about the 3-D plot; we railed against this type of "pop chart" in
Communication I, and here, the situation is compounded because the
figure duplicates information listed in the table of descriptive
statistics.
Standard
Court

Mean

Median

Deviation

Variance

State

$234.33

$246.16

$78.34

$6,137.14

Federal

$253.44

$245.06

$58.11

$3,376.57

$300
$250z

$200
$150
$100
$50 1'

Mean

Median

Figure 3: Descriptive statistics table and figure from Kao's study of awarded attorney
fees. The top panel displays the descriptive statistics table from Kao's article while the
bottom panel houses a reproduction of his 3-D plot. Kao aim is to provide summary
information about the composition of the variables of interest through descriptive
statistics, but raw numbers do not well serve his goals. The figure on the bottom is a
better idea, but a 3-D plot that is distracting in its design and does not account for the
distribution of the variables is not the best choice.

What of that table of descriptive statistics, a type of table that
has become so standard in legal publications that virtually all articles
with quantitative variables house one? Surely, by providing the
precise value of the mean and median (measures of central tendency)
and the standard deviation (a measure of dispersion), the author's
purpose is to convey "useful" information about the structure of a
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continuous variable(s). 36 This technique is an end, of course, that raw
data tables or even graphical displays of each observation cannot
reach, especially when the number of observations is large. But
because tables of descriptive statistics sacrifice visual clarity for the
sake of artificialprecision, they almost never meet that objective either.
Actually, if the goal is to convey information about a variable's
structure-including its center, spread, and shape-as it almost
always is, we strongly advise eradicating summary tables and
replacing them with appropriate graphical displays.
Let us elaborate, beginning with means and medians. For
continuous, quantitative variables, these measures of central tendency
tell us about the "center" of the distribution (in Kao's case, there are
two distributions, hourly rates awarded in federal civil rights cases
and hourly rates awarded in state civil rights cases). This is important
information, to be sure, but precise values are often unnecessary and,
more problematically, can obscure the message the authors seek to
convey. In most cases, researchers can make their point far more
accessibly, powerfully, and nearly as easily with a figure. Several
possibilities come to mind, though the boxplot is an excellent and timetested option, 37 especially when analysts such as Kao hope to draw
attention to a comparison between two or more continuous variables.

36. The mean is "the simple average," the median is "the middle of the distribution of
cases," and the standard deviation is a measure of spread or dispersion of the data. Epstein &
King, supra note 11, at 25-26; see also AGRESTI & FINLAY, supra note 25, at 45-58 (describing the
mean and median).
37. The boxplot was developed decades ago by John W. Tukey, a giant in the field of
scientific graphing. See JOHN W. TUKEY, EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS 39-43 (1977).
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Figure 4: Kao's data (see Figures 2 and 3) presented in a more efficient and informative
way, as box plots and violin plots. The box plots visually display the distribution of the
award variable, with particular attention drawn to the median award, the interquartile
range of the award, and any outliers. The violin plot provides similar information while
conveying an even clearer picture of the shape of the variable's distribution. Here, it is
easy to see that federal court awards are normally distributed while state court awards
are far more uniformly distributed.

Why boxplots remain one of the most important and frequently
used tools for data communication is no mystery: They are able to
convey

parsimoniously

and

clearly

an

enormous

amount

of

information about the distribution of a single variable(s). In a simple
plot, as we show in Figure 4, researchers can visually depict not only
the median but also the interquartile range, the minimum and
maximum values, and any observations that are unusually large or
small (i.e., the outliers). 38 In short, these representations communicate
precisely the right information without losing much, if any detail.
But the proof is in the pudding, and Figure 4 provides just
that. 39 There we have designed a boxplot from Kao's data. Note that

38. As represented by the boxplot in Figure 4, the interquartile range covers the data points
between the 25th and 75th percentiles. In other words, the box covers the middle 50% of the
data. The minimum and maximum values are the first and last values of the data when the
observations have been sorted from smallest to largest. Outliers, as represented by circles in the
Kao boxplot, are data points that are located further than 1.5 interquartile range units from the
upper or lower quartile; i.e., a great distance from center of the distribution. See WILLIAM S.
CLEVELAND, VISUALIZING DATA 25-26 (1993) and TUKEY, supra note 37, at 39-43, for more
information on the boxplot and its components.
39. See Communication I, supra note 6, where we make a series of suggestions for ensuring
that the many things that can go wrong with graphing data go right. Because of the detail
supplied there, we do not here dwell on design details (e.g., the appropriate plotting symbols,
etc.) for this or any other plot.
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the comparison Kao wishes to draw between hourly rates in state and
federal courts now just pops. The median lines are so close that they
are virtually indistinguishable, while equally as noticeable, the
interquartile range is larger for the state cases.
Just as boxplots, relative to tables of means and medians,
enhance visualization of the center and spread of a distribution,
graphs perform far better than precise values in conveying
information about the shape of the data. Think about it this way: Most
of us understand that if a variable is normally distributed (i.e., looks
bell-shaped), 95% of the observations fall within two standard
deviations of the mean. What we sometimes forget is that this rule-ofthumb is useful only when we know the variable is symmetric and
bell-shaped. Otherwise, knowing the precise value of the standard
deviation is not terribly valuable.
And therein emerges an enormous drawback of tables of
descriptive statistics: They do not reveal whether the data are
normally distributed. Only by inspecting the shape of a distribution
can researchers and their readers know whether this condition holds.
And only via a plot of the data can they conduct this inspection.
Tools for plotting distributions abound but two excellent
possibilities are violin plots and kernel density plots. Neither has
received much attention in legal journals. 40 They should.
Now widely used in statistics and gaining traction in the social
sciences, 41 the violin plot is a modern-day variant of the traditional
box plot. 42 As we show in Figure 4, it too provides information on the
40. A Lexis search of U.S. law reviews and journals (conducted January 15, 2007) uncovers
no relevant results for a search of "violin" within the same paragraph as "plot" or "graph." A
Lexis search of the same journals (conducted contemporaneously) turns up 10 articles utilizing
kernel density plots in some fashion.
41. See J. L. Hintze & Ray D. Nelson, Violin Plots: A Box Plot-Density Trace Synergism, 52
AM. STATISTICIAN 181 (1998) (developing the violin plot); see also Andrew G. Bunn & Scott J.
Goetz, Trends in Satellite-Observed CircumpolarPhotosynthetic Activity from 1982 to 2003: The
Influence of Seasonality, Cover Type, and Vegetation Density, 10 EARTH INTERACTIONS 1, 10
(2006) (using violin plots to show the distribution of slopes for models of major forest types and
categories of low growing vegetation); M. Jorgensen & Dag I.K. Sjoberg, Impact of Experience on
Maintenance Skills, 14 J. SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE & EVOLUTION 123, 131 (2002) (noting that
"the violin plot highlights the peaks and valleys of a variable's distribution"); Thomas R.
Steinheimer & Kenwood D. Scoggin, Fate and Movement of Atrazine, Cyanazine, Metolachlor,
and Selected Degradation Products in Water Resources of the Deep Loess Hills of Southwestern
Iowa, USA, 3 J. ENVTL. MONITORING 126, 128 (2001) (using a violin plot to reveal "an observed
distribution of values above the minimum detection limit"); Kenneth L. Weiss et al., Clinical
Brain MR Imaging Prescriptions in Talairach Space: Technologist and Computer-Driven
Methods, 24 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 922, 926 fig.6 (2003) (featuring a violin plot of prescription
errors).
42. See Hintze & Nelson, supra note 41, at 181 ("The violin plot.., synergistically combines
the box plot and the density trace (or smoothed histogram) into a single display that reveals
structure found within the data.").
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center of the variables (as indicated by the hollow white circles). But it
also relays crucial information-and information we cannot obtain
from tables of descriptive statistics-about the shape of the two
variables: federal hourly rates appear normally distributed, while
state rates are more uniform. The substantive impact of this result is
that federal courts are extremely likely to award hourly rates very
near the median value of $245.06. State courts, on the other hand, are
just as likely to award hourly fees of $300.00 or $175.00 per hour as
they are to award fees of $246.16, the median value. Whether this
result speaks to inconsistencies among state courts or about the cases
heard in those courts, we cannot say. Beyond speculation is that Kao's
conclusion-"[t]he
empirical evidence seems to suggest the
counterintuitive conclusion that approximately the same amount of
fees are awarded under the two competing methods"-now seems less
43
powerful.
The kernel density plot is a modern-day incarnation of a tool
that has received some attention among legal academics-the
histogram. Histograms are graphs of continuous (or nearly
continuous) observations grouped into a series of vertical bars along
the range of a variable's values. Although they can provide useful
information, histograms have a number of disadvantages, including
their arbitrarily designated "bins" and the relatively random
assignment of observations to those bins. 44 By smoothing over the
distribution with a continuous function, kernel density plots can
ameliorate some of these problems. They work by essentially
shrinking the bin-width of a histogram, and then using pieces of
continuous functions to create a single, smooth curve that
45
characterizes the distribution of the variable of interest.

43. Kao, supra note 28, at 843.
44. See CLEVELAND, supra note 38, at 8 (arguing that although the histogram is over a
century old and is widely used, "maturity and ubiquity do not guarantee the efficacy of a tool");
JACOBY, supra note 30, at 13-17 (noting that the arbitrary designation of bins impacts that shape
of the histogram, the assignment of the number of observations in each bin impacts the
bumpiness of the distribution, and the very nature of assigning bins means that data are forced
to be assigned to one group or another).
45.

See, e.g., B. W. SILVERMAN, DENSITY ESTIMATION FOR STATISTICS AND DATA ANALYSIS

(1986) (reviewing various approaches to kernel density estimation).
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Figure 5: A histogram and a kernel density plot of Schneider's seniority variable. The
histogram provides the reader with a richer understanding of the seniority variable and
its distribution than does Schneider's descriptive statistics table. Arguably, the kernel
density plot does an even better job because it makes the existence and location of the
positive skew more apparent.

To provide an example, reconsider Schneider's article on
judging in the tax context. Like Kao, Schneider provides a table of
descriptive statistics housing the mean and standard deviation for his
continuous variables, eliteness of undergraduate institution attended
(mean=62; std. deviation=9) and seniority (mean=12; std dev.=8).
And, as in the Kao study, we learn very little about the behavior of
these variables from the precise figures in the table. By turning to
visual displays that account for the distribution of continuous
variables, we can remedy this deficit. In Figure 5 we take this step,
creating a histogram and kernel density plot for one of Schneider's
continuous variables: seniority. The histogram provides some help in
understanding the distribution of these data. Even better, however, is
the kernel density plot. As might be expected, seniority is positively
skewed. The kernel density suggests that the mass of the distribution
falls between five and fifteen years; it is more difficult to make that
judgment from the histogram (and it is impossible to do so from the
table of descriptive statistics).
After perusing the graphs in Figures 4 and 5 we hope readers
can now understand why we so strongly recommend jettisoning tables
of summary statistics: it seems to us nearly impossible to conclude
that they are superior or even equal to visual depictions of a variable.
Graphs have the advantage of communicating far more informationand far more useful information-parsimoniously, clearly, and
powerfully. If the unusual circumstance arises and more precision is
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needed, exact numbers are easy enough to present visually 46 or can
appear in the caption.
2. Qualitative Variables: Jettison the Frequency Tables
Qualitative variables abound in the law literature. Race and
gender occasionally figure into studies of criminal law. 47 Research on
judging, regardless of the substantive context, often attends to the
party affiliation of judicial appointees, or the political official
appointing them. 48 And the method for disposing of a case, whether by
settlement, non-trial adjudication, or trial, comes into play in many
important studies of the litigation process. 49 While most researchers
46. See, e.g., supra fig.4, where we emphasize the median of the data.
47. See, e.g., Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who
Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229 (1996) (tracing
historically the perspective of women in the political and judicial systems); Devon W. Carbado,
(E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002) (arguing courts must recognize
certain "racial realities" for minorities to receive full Fourth Amendment protection); R. A.
Lenhardt, Understandingthe Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
803 (2004) (arguing courts should be sensitive to racial stigma); James S. Liebman, Slow
Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (2007) (discussing capital punishment's constitutionality); Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and
Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183 (2003) (surveying minority representation
in the criminal process); Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control,
1880-1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 101 (2006) (contrasting the degree of punishment between men
and women convicted for killing their significant others); Laura E. Reece, Women's Defenses to
Criminal Homicide and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Need for Relocation of
Difference, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 53 (1991) (suggesting criminal defendants' differing
perspectives be integrated into the substantive law); Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death
Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (2002) (examining
capital punishment through sexual bias analysis).
48. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice:
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) (creating a
"tournament" judging the merits of potential Supreme Court nominees); Thomas J. Miles & Cass
R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006) (examining policy judgments made by courts post-Chevron); Max
Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level
Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (2005) (analyzing the effect of jurisprudential
characteristics on federal criminal sentencing); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest
Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (1999) (asserting that
acknowledging the partisan component of judging would improve the federal judicial system).
49. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1995) (examining jurisprudential predilection's effect on case outcome); James S. Kakalik et al.,
Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil
Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17 (1997) (analyizing the CJRA's impact); Daniel Kessler,
Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (1996)
(arguing that more reliable results are provided by looking beyond the party's simple divergent
expectations in the selection of a case for litigation); Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric
Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451 (1998)
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understand that conveying descriptive statistics for such variables (at
least those with more than two categories) is uninformative, they have
developed equally uninformative ways to convey the composition of
those variables. Especially predominant in the law reviews are
frequency, or one-way, tables that depict the number (and, typically,
the percentage) of observations falling into each category of the
variable. In Schneider's research on the background of federal judges,
for example, he provides a table (part of which we reproduce in Table
1) showing the percentages and numbers of the judges in his dataset
who are male and female; white, black, Latino, and Asian; attended
elite law schools; and so on.
Discrete Variable Characteristic

Breakdown

Percentage

Gender (N= 1295)

Male
Female
White
Black
Latino
Asian
Non-elite
Elite
Private practice

82%
18%
90%
5%
4%
1%
52%
48%
62%

Judge

18%

Government
Law School Professor
Protestant
Catholic

10%
10%
57%
27%

Jewish
Other
Republican

15%
1%
58%

Democrat

42%

Race (N = 1290)

Eliteness of law school (N=1290)
Prior work experience (N=1289)

Religious affiliation (N=966)

Political affiliation of appointing
President
(N=1290)

Table 1: Descriptive statistics table from Daniel M. Schneider's study of the effect of
judge background characteristics on tax case outcomes. Although the frequencies in the
table provide details on the individual variables, it is unlikely that readers can quickly
process the information.

To be sure, this table communicates useful information. But is
Table 1-or, rather, frequency tables more generally-the best way to
convey this information? If the purpose is to provide readers with the
precise figures, then the answer is yes: frequency tables always trump
graphs. Figure 1, which houses dot plots of Schneider's variables,
underscores this point. While we can observe from the table that

(concluding that pretrial adjudication and settlement cause plaintiff win rates that tend toward
central, rather than extreme, results).
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exactly 48% of the judges attended elite law schools, we cannot make
that observation with the same degree of precision from the figure.
More often than not, though, as we have stressed throughout,
the degree of precision that frequency tables can convey is irrelevant.
Typically what we want to communicate to our audience (and to
ourselves) are comparisons, patterns, or trends, not exact values.
Schneider's work is no exception. What he apparently wants us to take
away from Table 1 is not the exact percentages of males and females,
or Democrats and Republicans, or Protestants, Catholics and Jews in
his data set but rather a sense of their relative proportions. Even for
variables with fewer than three categories, Figure 6 better serves this
purpose than Table 1.
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Gender
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Figure 6: Juxtaposed against Schneider's table of descriptive statistics (see Table 1), the
individual dot plots above provide a more visually and cognitively appealing solution to
the problem of providing the reader with information about the composition of
individual variables in a dataset.

A comparison of Schneider's data table with the dot plot of
religious affiliation in Figure 1 clarifies this point. Surely if we stared
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at the numbers long enough, we could observe the patterns that
emerge from the graph-e.g., the comparative equivalence of Jewish
and Catholic judges in his data base, not to mention the gap between
the latter and Protestants. But it requires far more (unnecessary)
cognitive work.
B. The RelationshipBetween Two or More Variables
In Schneider's study, conveying information about individual
variables was a prelude to multivariate analyses designed to reach an
inference about what causes judges to rule for or against taxpayers.
This is not unusual. Unless the author's sole goal is to showcase
particular variables in her sample, univariate displays are almost
always just the first step toward the larger goal of inference.
Not so of analyses of the relationship between two or more
variables. While some are certainly in the Schneider mold, 50 the
authors' goals are more variegated. Take Gross and Barnes' paper on
racial profiling in highway drug searches in Maryland between 19952000.51 As part of their investigation, they present data, some of which
is reproduced in the top panel of Figure 7, on the percentage of
searches per year by the driver's race. They neither draw a statistical

50. Take Epstein and Segal's study of Senate confirmations of Supreme Court justices, in
which they present a table of the relationship between a nominee's qualifications and ideology
and the number of votes he received in the Senate. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE
AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 114 fig.4 (2005). The table, reproduced

below, shows both the percentage of votes cast in favor of the nominee (the top number) and the
total number of votes in that category (the lower number). Epstein and Segal use the table not to
reach a causal inference about the effect of qualifications/ideology on votes-they realized that
many other factors influence votes-but rather to communicate to readers the plausibility of
such a relationship. With that demonstration in hand, they eventually moved toward a more
sophisticated analysis containing a variable for qualifications, along with many others, designed
to draw causal inferences.
Senate Voting Over Supreme Court Nominees Since 1953
Ideological Distance Between Nominee and Senator
Qualifications of Ideologically
Average
Ideologically
The Nominee
Very Close
Very Distant
Highly qualified
Qualified
Not Qualified

99.3
(602)
97.6
(422)
91.8
(182)

97.3
(299)
83.0
(317)
38.5
(96)

94.8
(231)
44.9
(187)
1.7
(115)

51. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002).
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inference from the table about the effect of race on highway stops, nor
do they use the data it contains in a subsequent multivariate analysis.
Rather, their primary purpose, it appears, is to convey trends in
searches in Maryland.

Number of Searches
Searches White
By
Black
Race
Hispanic

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000
(Jan-June)

564
20.7%
74.5%
3.6%

309
22.0%
65.0%
9.7%

116
39.7%
53.5%
6.9%

374
47.3%
45.5%
6.1%

607
39.9%
54.7%
5.8%

352
39.2%
53.4%
6.3%

1995

1996

1997

1998

2000

White

Li

02
0
ICU

Q)

CD)
C
0
Q.

0

0

CU

Hispanic

L I

I i

Year
Figure 7: The table on the top is a partial replication of Table 23 in Samuel R. Gross and
Katherine Y. Barnes' study on racial profiling on Maryland highways. The mosaic plot
on the bottom presents the same data in a more concise and appealing fashion. The
width of the bars depicts the number of searches per year while the height of each tile
conveys the relative number of searches that are conducted on drivers of each race
during each year. With this plot, it is much easier to see, for example, the large
percentage of searches in 1996 that are of black drivers and how that percentage
decreases sharply beginning in 1997.
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We could say the same of Cumming and Maclntosh's study of
how venture capitalists respond to the economic incentives in periods
of boom and bust. 52 Among the researchers' arguments is that the
existence of corruption during boom years (in their data set, 1999 and
2000) leads to considerable underpricing. To explore it, they present
their raw data in tabular form (reprinted in the left of Figure 8).
Again, the goal does not appear to be inference-the authors provide
no statistics or measures of uncertainty-but rather to determine
whether their argument and their data coincide.

Year

Millions of dollars of
2000 purchasing power
Market
Sales

0-

Price

1980

$183

$78

1981
1982
1983
1984

$107
$118
$155
$85

$54
$38
$86
$79

1996

$365

$149

1997
1998
1999
2000

$309
$600
$1,415
$1,528

$167
$305
$343
$253

0

500

1000

1500

Market Prbce

Figure 8: The market price and sales price for IPOs, by year. The left panel is a partial
reproduction of Cumming and Macintosh's raw data table. The right panel is a bivariate
scatter plot of the full data set. The solid line is a smooth loess curve that summarizes
the relationship between the market price and the sales price. Outlier points, indicated
by the diamond shaped symbols, represent the data from 1999 and 2000, the two boom
53
years in their study.

52. Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey Macintosh, Boom, Bust, and Litigation in Venture Capital
Finance,40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867 (2004).
53. These data appeared id. at 885 tbl.3. The table was reproduced by the authors from Tim
Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time? (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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Juliano and Schwab's study of federal sexual harassment cases
is of a different order.5 4 As even a mere glance at their table (reprinted
in the top panel of Figure 9) would reveal (note, in particular, the chisquare statistic, along with a p-value), they are performing statistical
inference. Here, the authors are using their data to learn about the
association between their dependent variable, plaintiff success, and
key independent variables: court type (district or appellate) and
visibility (trial or not, published opinion or not).
Certainly the three studies depicted in Figures 7 through 9
investigate different actors-police, venture capitalists, and judgesand each deploys data for different reasons-to draw attention to
trends and to make inferences. But they share two features: all seek to
convey information about the relationship between two or more
variables, and because they use tabular displays, all three fail to
realize their potential to ensure successful decoding of the data by the
reader.
APPELLATE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

Circuit
1st
2d
3d
5t

loll
1T
D.C.
Total

All Cases
% PI
# of

Cases w/ Trials
% PI
# of

Wins

Cases

Wins

50.0
50.0
43.4
38.5
47.4
58.3
53.5
50.0
64.5
50.0
62.1
53.3
51.1
chi2=
8.36

20
62
53
39
19
24
116
30
31
64
29
15
502
Pr.=
0.681

57.1
38.1
16.7
33.3
33.3
55.6
60.0
50.0
85.7
47.1
53.3
28.6
45.2
chi2=
15.94

All Cases
# of
% PI

Published Opinions
% PI
# of

Cases

Wins

Cases

Wins

Cases

7
21
18
12
6
9
20
18
7
17
15
7
157
Pr.
0.143

42.9
80.0
37.5
21.1
38.5
28.0
27.3
72.7
63.6
33.3
85.7
0.0
39.0
chi2=
24.78

7
5
8
19
13
25
33
11
11
24
7
1
164
Pr.=
0.010

50.0
80.0
37.5
30.0
38.5
44.4
32.1
72.7
70.0
31.6
83.3
0.0
45.2
chi2 =
17.41

6
5
8
10
13
9
28
11
10
19
6
1
126
Pr.=
0.096

Table 2: Plaintiff victory rates in sexual harassment cases across court type (district or
appellate) and case type (trial or not, published or unpublished opinion) reproduced
from Juliano and Schwab's Table 4. For a more effective way to present the data, see
Figure 9 below.

54. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 548 (2001).
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Figure 9: Plaintiff victory rates in sexual harassment cases across court type (district or
appellate) and case type (trial or not, published or unpublished opinion). The raw data
table, reproduced in Table 2, provides an overflow of information. These conditional dot
plots provide an effective alternative, making it is easy to see at first glance that, e.g.,
D.C.'s circuit court has never ruled for the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case while
the 11th Circuit often does.

To drive home this point, in Figures 7 through 9 we have
converted the tables into plots. Note that the displays differ. This
divergence, as we explain below, is completely appropriate given that
the variables of interest are of different types: in the Gross and Barnes
study, a qualitative variable; and in the case of Cummings and
Macintosh, quantitative variables. Juliano and Schwab's study mixes
the two types but, because it analyzes the relationship between three
variables, it presents something of a special case.
When an author seeks to present data over time, the data are
typically numerical. Consider LoPucki and Kalin's study of
bankruptcies, published in the pages of this journal. 55 As part of their
analysis, the authors present the table depicted in the top panel of
Figure 10, purporting to show that the rate of bankruptcy filings
varies considerably from year to year. Because meaningful variationor the lack thereof-is nearly impossible to discern from the precise
55. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND. L. REV. 231
(2001).
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values in the table, we transformed the data into a time series plot
depicting what seems to be the chief variable of interest to the
authors-rate of filings.
Year
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
All
Years

Public companies
filing bankruptcy
89
121
149
149

Number of public
companies
9,047
10,717
11,121
12,450

Rate of public
company filing
0.98%
1.13%
1.34%
1.20%

112
122
135
115
125
91
86
70
84
84
82
122
145
1,881

14,620
16,355
18,090
16,123
13,424
12,114
12,764
13,019
12,753
12,977
13,173
12,442
11,998
223,187

0.77%
0.75%
0.75%
0.71%
0.93%
0.75%
0.67%
0.54%
0.66%
0.65%
0.62%
0.98%
1.21%
0.84%

1985

1995

1990

Year
Figure 10: Rate of public company filings for bankruptcy, by year. Lopucki and Kalin's
table, reproduced above, provides the raw data on bankruptcy filings, making it difficult
to decipher trends in filings across time. Below their table, we provide a time series plot
of the same data. Data points for each year are represented by a hollow circle. The time
series plot draws attention to the high rate of filings in 1985 and 1999 and low rates in
the intervening years.

We leave it to readers to determine whether they agree with
LoPucki and Kalin's conclusion about the degree of variation, but at
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least they are now equipped to form an opinion: decoding the
information in the graph, as opposed to the table, is cognitively
undemanding. More generally, simple time series plots are a handy
solution when the variable of interest is continuous.
Studies seeking to depict qualitative variables-such as race in
the Gross and Barnes study 56-over time present more of a challenge.
Because a time series plot would serve to hinder and not enhance
decoding, scholars confronting this challenge tend to fall back on a
rough-and-ready solution: the cross-tabulation ("cross-tab"), which
displays the joint distribution of two (or more) variables in a
(contingency) table.
This "solution" is ubiquitous in the law reviews but, like the
table of descriptive statistics, the cross-tab should be banished, and
banished for a similar reason: it often obscures, rather than clarifies,
the very patterns the author wishes to highlight. Take Gross and
Barnes' study. 57 The researchers hope to convey information about
search trends, but with three categories of race dispersed over six time
periods these trends are extremely difficult to detect (see Figure 7).
Enter the mosaic plot. These are created by using appropriately
sized rectangles to illustrate the marginal and joint distribution of the
variables. The width of each bar on the x-axis shows the marginal
distribution of that variable. Within each bar, the plot shows the
fraction corresponding to the variable on the y-axis. 58 Providing an
example is Figure 7, in which we transformed Gross & Barnes' search
data into a mosaic plot. Now we can visualize both the composition of
the race variable in each year, as well as any trends over time. And,
indeed, upon a quick glance at Figure 7, the reader simply cannot miss
the decline in searches conducted of black drivers in 1995 and in 1998.
It is also clear from the plot that the fewest searches were undertaken
in 1997 and the most in 1999. Drawing the same conclusions via the
authors' original cross tabulation would be possible but only with
concerted effort.
C. The Relationship Between Two Variables: Scatterplots
Mosaic plots of the sort shown in Figure 7 work particularly
well for the Gross and Barnes data, but they are not limited to
56. Gross & Barnes, supranote 51.
57. Id.
58. Mosaic plots were first developed in J.A. Hartigan & B. Kleiner, Mosaics for
Contingency Tables, in COMPUTER SCIENCE AND STATISTICS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH
SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERFACE (W.F. Eddy ed., 1981) and were further refined in Michael
Friendly, Mosaic Displays for Multi-Way Contingency Tables, 89 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 190 (1994).
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variables organized in a time series fashion. Indeed, unless
researchers need to convey precise data values-which is almost never
the case-we urge them to substitute mosaic plots for cross-tabs of two
categorical variables.
That same advice does not hold for two continuous quantitative
variables. The tiles on the plot would grow so small that it would
make decoding impossible. In this situation, analysts ought5 9 to
consider employing a graphic workhorse, the bivariate scatterplot.
Earlier we encountered univariate scatterplots, which display
all the observations of a single variable (see Figure 2). Bivariate
scatterplots, as the name suggests, display the joint distribution of the
observations of two quantitative variables. When constructed with
sound graphing techniques in mind, 60 bivariate scatterplots can be
quite useful for examining the relationship between two variables of
interest.
Unfortunately, analysts all too often miss the opportunity to
convey data using this important tool. Cumming and Macintosh's
study is a clear example. Recall the authors' basic claim: that
underpricing will occur during economic booms (in their dataset, the
period between 1999-2000). While they say this effect is recognizable
in their data, from their tabular presentation (see Figure 8), it is hard
to spot. A time series plot would provide an easy fix but one that does
not follow from their basic claim: they are not suggesting a trend over
time but rather an association between economic conditions and
sales-a perfect application of the scatterplot.
We have taken advantage of this opportunity, and transformed
Cumming and Macintosh's raw data into a scatterplot (see Figure 8),
with two embellishments: a loess fit and distinct symbols for the two
boom years. A loess, or locally weighted regression, curve is a smooth
plot 61 through the middle of the distribution of plotted observations.
The smooth loess curve summarizes how the two plotted variables

59. In the physical, biological, and social sciences, the predominant graph is the scatterplot,
appearing in its many variations; indeed, scholars have estimated that 75% of the graphs used in
the sciences are scatterplots. See Ian Spence & Robert F. Garrison, A Remarkable Scatterplot, 47
AM. STATISTICIAN 12 (1993). Analysts often use simple scatterplots before analyzing their data,
and the insights gained may stimulate the production of more complicated variations or may
guide the choice of a model.
60. Like so many other visualization tools, bivariate scatterplots can go awry. To avoid
unnecessary problems, Cleveland recommends the use of visually prominent plotting symbols,
outward facing tick marks, and, where necessary, jittering, along with the avoidance of grid
lines. CLEVELAND, supra note 31, at 158. See also JACOBY, supra note 30, at 52-56;
Communication I, supra note 6, for a recommendation of similar approaches.
61. As the smoothness parameter a increases, so too increases the smoothness of the loess
curve.
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depend on one another. 62 In Figure 8, the loess curve shows a general
and not unexpected trend in the data: as market price increases so to
do sales. But more importantly, it draws attention to the two
hypothesized outliers: the two boom years distinguished in the data as
enlarged diamonds.
D. The RelationshipAmong More than Two Variables: Conditional
Plots
If Figure 8 suggests anything, it is that Cumming and
Macintosh demanded too much from their readers. Relative to the
scatterplot, the raw data table obscures their message.
This problem is even more acute in Juliano and Schwab's table
(see Table 2). Because they are making claims about the relationship
between one outcome variable (whether the plaintiff wins) and two
explanatory variables (court and visibility), their tabular depiction is
especially complex and the data it houses quite difficult to decode.
Information overload is apparent. Breaking down the variables into
smaller conditioning plots, as we recommended in Communication I
and as we have now done in Figure 9, helps clarify the data
enormously. 63 Note that many of the authors' key takeaway pointsincluding that "the success rate of plaintiffs varies dramatically by
circuit"64-are far easier to spot.
III. PRESENTING RESULTS
By transforming their data into more attractive and
informative displays, we certainly do not mean to portray Juliano and
Schwab's-or any other authors'-work in a negative light. In all the
articles we have discussed, the data work is quite sound. It is the use
of data tables to which we object, even though we, of course, recognize
that tables housing raw data or descriptive statistics have a long
tradition in the law reviews. For decades now, to provide but one
example, the Harvard Law Review has provided data summaries of
65
the Supreme Court's term.
62. See e.g., CLEVELAND, supra note 31, at 170.
63. Also note our use of dot plots. As was the case for our earlier example regarding
Subramanian's article, the number of measurements in Juliano and Schwab's study is small
enough and the circuits well known enough that labeling each serves a substantive purpose.
64. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 54, at 574.
65. Harvard Law Review's practice of publishing Supreme Court statistics from the
preceding term began in 1949. The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV.
415, 415 (2005) (citing The Supreme Court, 1948 Term-The Business of the Court, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 119 (1949)).
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Beyond their use of tables, the Harvard project, Kao's analysis
of hourly fees, 6 6 and Gross and Barnes' study of drug searches 67 have
another common feature. They are largely descriptive efforts. Such
may have dominated empirical legal scholarship for many years. But
omnipresent now are attempts at performing causal inference, which,
in law reviews, typically means invoking regression-based tools to
assess the extent to which a variable(s) of interest causes an outcome
or response. Examples we have discussed in our series on effective
communication include Staudt's study of federal taxpayer standing,
Epstein et al.'s work on the development of the norm of consensus on
the U.S. Supreme Court, and Roe's analysis of the effect of national
politics on the proportion of firms under diffuse ownership in rich
68
countries.
To be sure, these studies, along with the many others we could
cite, vary in important ways. They raise different research questions
and cover distinct substantive areas of the law; they even deploy
different regression tools, including linear regression, probit, and logit.
What does not vary much are the tools used to convey the research
results: With only limited exceptions, they are uninformative both to
laypersons and the statistically savvy alike. The ills are many, from
(once again) a reliance on inaccessible tables, to displays and
narrative that fail to convey substantive effects and uncertainly about
those effects.
In what follows, we offer a step-by-step corrective. For the sake
of clarity, we rely on a single running example throughout: the
confirmation of nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court. Specifically, we
consider how to convey the results of a statistical model that seeks to
explain the individual votes cast by senators over Supreme Court
nominees since 1937 (Black through Alito). 69 Following from work in
the social sciences, the key causal variables of interest are (1) the
degree to which a senator perceives the candidate as qualified for
office 70 and (2) the ideological distance between the senator and the

66. Kao, supra note 28.
67. Gross & Barnes, supra note 51.
68. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001); Mark J. Roe, PoliticalPreconditionsto Separating
Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling
Standing, 79 VA. L. REV. 612 (2004).
69. This model follows from work by EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 50; Charles M. Cameron,
Albert D. Cover, & Jeffrey A. Segal, Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A
Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 530 tbl.2 (1990); Lee Epstein et al., The
Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296 (2006).
70. Previous work has assessed this by analyzing the content of newspaper editorials
written from the time of the nomination until the vote by the Senate and then deriving a
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candidate, 7 1 such that the more qualified the nominee and the closer
the nominee is to the senator on the ideological spectrum, the more
likely the senator is to cast a yea vote. Also following from the extant
literature, we control for two other possible determinants of senators'
votes: whether the president was "strong" in the sense that his party
controlled the Senate and he was not in his fourth year of office; and
whether a senator is of the same political party as the president.
To assess the extent to which these variables help us account
for senators' votes, we employ probit regression, a common tool in
legal scholarship, appropriate when the dependent variable is binary,
72
as it is here.
The top panel of Table 3 depicts the statistical estimates, and,
crucially, depicts them in a way that seems to follow standard
operating procedure in many law reviews.

qualifications score for each nominee. These Segal-Cover scores range from 0 (most qualified) to
1 (least qualified). See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 50, at 114 fig.4; Cameron, Cover & Segal,
supra note 69, at 530 tbl.2..
71. Following Epstein et al., supra note 69, at 299, we measure the ideological distance
between a senator and a nominee via the generation of Common Space scores for each nominee.
More detail on the creation of this measure is available in Epstein et al., supra note 69, so suffice
it to say here that these scores are generated by "bridging" candidates nominated by presidents
whose party holds a majority of Senate seats. These "bridged" nominees receive the Segal-Cover
scores, see discussion supra note 70, of their appointing president, and those scores, along with
their Segal-Cover scores, permit a linear transformation. The result is that Common Space
scores can be created for all nominees based on their Segal-Cover scores.
72. We could have also conducted our estimation with a logistic regression model. Like
probit, logistic ("logit") regression is utilized when the dependent variable is dichotomous. The
structural models of logit and probit are different, but they are related to each other in such a
way that logit coefficients, when statistically significant, are approximately 1.7 times larger than
probit coefficients, making the choice between the two models "largely one of convenience and
convention." LONG, supra note 27, at 47-49, 83.
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Variable
Lackqual
EucIdist
Strngprs
Sameprty
Intercept

Coefficient
-2.217**
-2.320**
0.589*
0.765"*
1.788**

N
Log-likelihood
,

2(4)

(Std. Err.)
(0.374)
(0.441)
(0.286)
(0.220)
(0.285)
3809
-928.282
80.406

Variable
Nominee's Lack of Qualifications
Ideological Distance between the Nominee and Senator
President Controls Senate and is Not in His Last Year of Office
Senator and President Share Party Affiliation
Constant
N
Reduction of Error in Predicting Senators' Votes

[Vol. 60:3:801

Coefficient
-2.217*
-2.320*
0.589*
0.765*
1.788*

(Std. Err.)
(0.374)
(0.441)
(0.286)
(0.220)
(0.285)

3809
26.5%

Table 3: Probit regression analysis of the effects on individual senators' votes on 41
Supreme Court nominees (Black through Alito). Cell entries are probit coefficients and
robust standard errors clustered on the nominee (in parentheses). In the top table, *
indicates p < 0.05 while ** indicates p < 0.01. In the bottom table * indicates p < 0.05.
Although the two tables present the same statistical results, the bottom table, by, e.g.,
eliminating multiple stars for different levels of statistical significance and providing
meaningful variable names, better enables readers to understand the results.

What we argue below is that this standard approach to
presenting the results of a probit analysis-or, for that matter, any
multivariate regression procedure-ought to be reconsidered. In
particular, we suggest that authors (1) rework tables so that they not
only stand alone from the text but are themselves informative; (2)
convey the substantive effects of key variables of interest; and (3)
communicate uncertainty73 Adhering to these rules will go some
distance toward enhancing the impact of analysts' research projects if
only because the audience will now better understand the results.
A. (How to) ProduceInformative TabularDisplays of Statistical
Results
Throughout our series we have counseled against tabular
depictions of data. Frankly, and for the reasons we offer below, we feel
no differently about tables displaying regression estimates (e.g., Table
3). Nonetheless, we understand that even in the social sciences
readers have come to expect them; we also realize that, occasionally,
73. The recent work by Gelman et al. and King et al. has been particularly influential in
establishing the need to convey uncertainty and providing the equipment to do so. Gelman,
supranote 10; King et al., supra note 8. We follow their lead here.
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they can convey valuable information if only to the statistically
7 4
informed reader.
As a result, though incorporating tables of estimates into
presentations or papers is sometimes necessary, they surely need not
be as utterly uninformative as the top panel of Table 3. One obvious
problem is the variable names are not clear; e.g., from a mere glance
at the table readers could not possibly know that "eucldist" means the
"ideological distance between the nominee and the senator."
We understand how this problem comes about. When
researchers enter data into a statistical package, they often shorten a
variable's name; and when they estimate their regression model, they
simply cut and paste the resulting table into their text file. This is
good practice if and only if researchers are indifferent to their
audience. Hoping that no reader of our series falls into this category,
we suggest using descriptive names to label the variables as we have
done in the bottom panel of Table 3. Note that we also clearly convey
the dependent variable, a crucial piece of information, yet one
surprisingly missing in many empirical studies. We use the caption for
this purpose but other plausible locations include the table's title or
column head.
Turning to the statistical estimates, both panels present the
coefficient estimates and standard errors, as they should. These
numbers convey information about the direction of the effect of the
coefficient (indicated by the sign on the coefficient) and the presence of
statistical significance (indicated by the relationship between the
standard error and the coefficient), 75 even if the coefficients
themselves are difficult to interpret substantively. Troubling,
however, is the top panel's use of two different asterisks to denote
statistical significance, * forp 0.05 and ** forp _<0.01. Because this
all-too-common practice may lead readers to inappropriately compare
p-values, 76 we suggest omitting the asterisks altogether. Readers can
74. For example, for regression models, knowing the scale of the variable of interest allows
the reader to contextualize the regression coefficient. It is necessary to know the scale of the
=
dependent and independent variable for the reader to understand what a
-2.217 actually
means. Additionally, outside of the linear regression context, such substantive interpretations of
coefficients are extremely difficult because they require the reader to make complex calculations
that depend on the values of the independent variables. Thus, why ask the reader to do these
calculations for a multivariate statistical analysis when conveying results in an easy-to-consume
manner with figures is straight forward. We emphasize this point in the text to follow.
75. Without the presence of a statistically significant relationship between the coefficient
and the dependent variable, there is no reason to test the substantive effect of a variable.
76. The arbitrary setting of a p-value simply means that a researcher wants to have a
certain level of confidence (known as the a-level) in the accuracy of the estimated relationship of
the variables. Providing differing levels of p-values merely amounts to having different levels of
confidence in the statistical relationship. It would certainly be incorrect to say that, in Table 3,
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discern whether a variable is "statistically significant" from the
standard error. Alternatively, authors can choose a level (typically a =
0.05) and use just one * (see the bottom panel of Table 3).
Finally, to be complete, researchers should provide summary
information about their model. The N (number of cases in the sample)
is essential, 77 though it too is occasionally absent from many tabular
displays. Ns can be placed in the caption or in a column, as we have
done in Table 3. For models estimated by maximum likelihood, it is
good practice to report the log-likelihood (or the deviance, which is -2
times the log-likelihood). This quantity is useful for a number of
statistical tests. A measure of the predictive power of the model is also
essential. In linear regression, R-squared is among the most common;
for probit models of the sort we display in the table, a reduction of
error assessment works well. 78 Conversely, we advise against
reporting omnibus test statistics, such as the F statistic, (often used in
linear regression) or likelihood ratio tests (e.g., the chi-square in the
top panel of Table 3). Neither conveys information that is
substantively useful. Indeed, if these tests are significant (and in
practice, they always are), all one learns is that something in the
model is related to the dependent variable.

the coefficient for the president controlling the Senate is less important of a finding than the
others simply because it is only statistically significant at the .05 level as opposed to the .01
level. See AGRESTI & FINLAY, supra note 25, for more information on p-values, a-levels, and the
proper use and interpretation of each.
77. Because some statistical techniques are inappropriate for studies with a small number
of observations, reporting the N provides a check. For example, the properties of maximum
likelihood estimation models, such as probit, do not hold when sample sizes are too small. See
LONG, supra note 27, at 54 ("It is risky to use [maximum likelihood] with sample smaller than
100, while samples over 500 seem adequate. These values should be raised depending on
characteristics of the model and the data.")
78. Reporting the proportional reduction in error from the newly estimated model provides
information about the utility of the researcher's chosen model. With the assistance of statistical
software, computing this reduction in error is also simple. For example, in Stata, after the model
has been estimated, the user need simply install and use the "pre" command to yield this
reduction in error. Within the software, this is computed by finding the errors when simple
guessing is employed and then finding the number of errors after the model has been estimated.
The final proportional reduction in error is computed by subtracting the number of errors in the
model from the number of guessing errors and dividing that number by the number of guessing
errors.
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Figure 11: Nomogram depicting the results from Table 3's probit regression analysis of
the effects on individual senators' votes on forty-one Supreme Court nominees (Black
through Alito). Nomograms allow the reader to visually discern the estimated
coefficients and the uncertainty around the estimates and to quickly discern whether
the effects are statistically significant by looking at whether the confidence intervals
cross zero.

These recommendations are designed to help authors create
informative tables that do not require the reader to slog through the
text in order to, for example, identify variables. For those analysts
who need not present precise values but are more concerned with
providing their audience with a feel for their estimates, a nomogram
(see Figure 11) provides an ideal alternative to a table. 79 Nomograms
are dotplots in which the estimated coefficient is represented by the
dot, and the confidence interval is depicted by error bars. Visually, we
can determine statistical significance by noting whether the error bars
cross zero. It is also easy to compare the relative magnitude of
coefficients, if that is meaningful for a given study.
B. Communicate Substantive Effects and Uncertainty About Those
Effects
As researchers, we are inherently interested in whatever
question we are investigating at the moment-to us, our work is
exciting stuff. But conveying our results as we do in Table 3 and even
in Figure 11 could not be less inviting in presentation. Displays of
79.

For a similar graphical display of statistical results, see supra Figure 1.
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estimated coefficients that fill the law reviews and even social science
journals are not just ugly; they convey virtually no information of
interest. Certainly, of our probit analysis we could say "The estimated
coefficient on lackqual means that, holding all else constant, a one
unit increase in lack of qualifications yields a -2.217 unit decrease on
the cumulative Normal scale." Because (almost) no one would
understand what this means, we usually just write, "the coefficient on
lackqual is statistically significant at the .05 level." But even this is
not a very informative statement to many readers-even those with
80
knowledge of statistics.
In short, the way we typically present regression-based results
only works to dampen enthusiasm for our research. We can do better.
More to the point, we should want to do better. How? In Figure 12, we
provide a three-step process, moving from unacceptable to optimal
communication.

80. See Communication I, supra note 6, at 1831-31, where we make a similar point. See
generally King et al., supra note 8 (making similar arguments); Gelman, supra note 10 (same).
Our inspiration for this section follows from their work, especially King et al.
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The Ugly Table
Variable
lackqual
eucldist
strngprs
saneprty
Intercept

Coefficient
-2.217"*
-2.320"*
0.589"
0.765 *°
1.788""

(Std. Err.)
(0.374)
(0.441)
(0.286)
(0.220)
(0.285)

Good Communication: Estimate A Key Quantity of Interest
Other things being equal, when a nominee is perceived as highly unqualified the likelihood of a
senator casting a yea vote is only 0.27. That probability increases to a near-sure bet yea vote
(0.91) when the nominee is highly qualified.

Better Communication: Estimate A Key Quantity of Interest, Plus Uncertainty
Other things being equal, when a nominee is perceived as highly unqualified the likelihood of a
senator casting a yea vote is only about O.iL7 [.21, .33]. That probability increases to a
near-sure bet yea vote 0.91 [.89, -931 when the nominee is highly qualified.

Best Communication: Graph Quantity of Interest Plus Uncertainty Across Values

Figure 12: An illustration of moving from unacceptable to optimal communication of
research results. Adapting this schema to their own projects and needs should help
researchers better relay their story. To generate the predicted probabilities and
confidence intervals, we used Stata and the SPost package of post-estimation
commands. Holding the ideological distance between a senator and a nominee at its
mean value and the other two independent variables at 0 (meaning that the president is
weak and the nominee and voting senator are of different political parties), we move
from a highly unqualified nominee to a highly qualified nominee. Confidence intervals
were computed using bootstrapping.
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As a first step, the empiricist must ask him or herself, "What
substantively interesting features of my results do I want to convey to
my readers?" In our running example, several quantities of interest
come to mind, but to keep it simple we begin with one: the probability
that a senator will cast a vote for a highly unqualified (qualified)
candidate. Communicating this piece of information is a start toward
engaging on-going debates, such as whether a nominee's ideology is
now so paramount that qualifications are irrelevant to senators.8 1 It is
also a rather straightforward way to begin the move away from a sole
emphasis on statistical significance and toward a stress on
substantive importance.
In Figure 12, under "Good Communication," we take this step
by translating our inaccessible probit coefficients into substantively
important quantities of interest: the odds of a yea vote when a
candidate is highly qualified and when a candidate is highly
unqualified for office, other things being equal. By that last phrase, we
mean that the other variables in the model-ideological distance,
strong president, and same party-are each set at fixed values. For
example, for the statement in Figure 12, we set the ideological
distance between a senator and nominee at its mean and the other two
variables at 0 (weak president and senator of a different political
party). But from our results we could have just as easily developed
another counterfactual, such as the effect of qualifications when the
ideology of the senator and nominee are very distant or when the
president is "strong." Alternatively, we could have shifted focus
entirely and considered the effect of ideological distance when we hold
qualifications at its mean. For example,
Other things being equal, when a nominee and senator are ideologically very distant the
likelihood of a senator casting a yea vote is only 5%. That probability increases to a
near-sure bet yea vote (90%) when the nominee and senator are ideologically very
82
close.

Estimating a quantity of interest is a good start. But even
better communication, as we show in Figure 12, entails conveying
error around that estimate. Because we covered uncertainty and its
81. See, e.g., WERL, On Tournaments for Appointing Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme
Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 157 (2005) (commenting on debate over "whether the current
system [for appointing justices] does any better than [a] tournament in predicting skills that
include the ability to compromise and negotiate, a talent for shaping national policy, and a gift
for choosing among the thousands of petitions for certiorari filed with the Court").
82. This is the predicted probability of a senator casting a yea vote for a Supreme Court
nomination when a nominee's (lack of) qualifications are held at their mean, when the president
is weak (i.e., his party does not control the Senate), and when the voting senator and the
president are of different political parties, changing the ideological distance between the nominee
and the voting senator from distant to close.
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importance in Communicating I, we need not go into detail here.
Suffice it to note that most of us would be highly skeptical of a survey
that failed to provide readers with the margin of error or a table of
regression estimates that omitted standard errors or confidence
intervals. We should be equally skeptical of claims about substantive
effects that fail to do so (via, e.g., confidence intervals). To see why,
consider two hypothetical versions of the claim above:
1. Other things being equal, when a nominee and senator are
ideologically very distant the likelihood of a senator casting a
yea vote is 30%, though it could be as low as 25% or as high as
35%.
versus
2. Other things being equal, when a nominee and senator are
ideologically very distant the likelihood of a senator casting a
yea vote is 30%, though it could be as low as 1% or as high as
60%.
In both examples, the (point) estimate of the impact of ideology
is identical (30%) but our certainty about that estimate differs
dramatically. So dramatically, in fact, that we should be highly
skeptical of the second claim: because the confidence interval goes
beyond 50% we cannot eliminate the real possibility of a yea vote even
when the senator and candidate are ideologically very dissimilar.
More generally, the examples above and in Figure 12 go some
distance toward bridging the gap between researchers and their
audience. Unlike the terms "statistical significance," "coefficient" or
"0.01 level," statements containing quantities of interest and error are
easy to understand and, crucially to evaluate, even by the most
83
statistically challenged among us.
We would thus be delighted if every article published in the
law reviews supplanted the sterile "statistically significant at the .05
level" with the substantively informative, "other things being
equal.. . ." We would be even more delighted, as would all readers of
empirical work, if researchers took it to the next level and graphed
their results. Actually, the advantages of generating visual displays
are so great that analysts should need very little encouragement to
move in this direction.
First, while substantive claims of the form "...
when a
nominee is perceived as highly unqualified the likelihood of a senator
casting a yea vote is only about 0.27 [.21, .33]" may be informative,
these claims exclude a lot of information, such as the values in

83.

King et al., supra note 8, at 359-60, makes this point, and we adopt it here.
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between "highly unqualified" and "highly qualified." To provide these
quantities, we could generate a long series of statements-e.g., when a
nominee is perceived as minimally qualified, on average qualified, and
so on. But graphing the results is a far more parsimonious, pleasing,
and, for our readers, cognitively less demanding approach.
Underscoring these points is the bottom display in Figure 12.
Here we juxtapose Lack of Qualifications against Ideological Distance.
Specifically, in the first three panels we show the probability of a
senator casting a yea vote across the range of Lack of Qualifications
and when we set Ideological Distance at its minimum, mean, and
maximum levels. In that triptych we depict our uncertainty, in the
form of 95% confidence intervals, with vertical lines. To avoid
cluttering the fourth panel, we eliminate the confidence intervals and
simply show the three sets of probabilities.
This display, we believe, is a good example of what we mean by
parsimony. It conveys a great deal of information-actually it encodes
132 pieces of information-quite efficiently. Or at least more
efficiently than the 132 sentences it would have taken to describe each
and every result depicted in the four panels.
A second and perhaps even more important virtue of graphing
results centers on pattern detection. From the display in Figure 12,
several results are immediately apparent. Chiefly, we observe the
conditional nature of the relationship between qualifications and
ideology: the effect of a nominee's qualifications, in other words,
depends at least in part on the nominee's ideology vis-a-vis the
senator. So, for example, professional merit has far less of an impact
on nominees who are extremely ideologically distant from senators
than on those who are more proximate; the former, even those who are
highly qualified (0 in Figure 12), confront low odds (about .15) in their
quests for confirmation. Surely, this is crucial information for both
researchers and their readers, but it is virtually undetectable from the
"ugly table" of coefficients.
C. How to Communicate Substantive Effects and Uncertainty
We believe the advantages of the sorts of narratives and graphs
we depict in Figure 12 are obvious. For readers, they need not struggle
to make sense of regression estimates that even the analyst may have
trouble understanding. Nor are critical questions left dangling, such
as "are the results substantively important?" and "how sure is the
researcher about the findings?" As we have stressed throughout this
series of articles, the advantages for analysts are equally obvious,
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ranging from the detection of patterns in their own work to the ability
to impart their own excitement to their audience.
If there is a downside for authors, it is that communicating
quantities of interest and uncertainty requires more time and more
thought. To see why, think about current practices (at least as they
appear to us): The legal empiricist estimates a regression model,
hopefully performs some diagnostic checks, and then cuts and pastes
the resulting table into a Word file. End of story. As Figure 12
suggests, much more is needed-and the "more" mandates that
researchers learn about procedures enabling them to estimate
substantive effects (and confidence intervals). We remain catholic as
to the precise tools one should use to perform this work, but we can
say that researchers can implement nearly all our suggestions using
common statistical packages, such at Stata or SPSS. Three add-on
packages that make computing substantive effects easy are
CLARIFY8 4 and SPost85 for Stata, and Zelig 86 for the R language.
Whatever statistical package researchers decide to employ, it is
the more general message that we hope they do not miss: collecting
and compiling data, and then estimating a model, should not complete
the task. Similar thought and care should be used to effectively
communicate the results of a study.
IV. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES IN THE COMMUNICATION OF DATA AND
RESULTS

As we draw to the close of our series, we cannot help but hope
we have provided legal researchers with some guidance on how to
more effectively communicate their data and results. The benefits of
following the standards that we have articulated, we believe, well
outweigh the costs. Sure, empiricists must now familiarize themselves
with a new set of tools for presenting their work, but once they do
numerous advantages will accrue. Because they will be better situated
to detect patterns in their own data, their own work will improve;
because their audience will be better able to understand their work,
its impact will be greater.
These should be sufficient incentives for change. But
recognizing that additional prodding may be necessary, we want to
84. CLARIFY can be found at Michael Tomz et al., CLARIFY: Software for Interpretingand
PresentingStatisticalResults, June 1, 2001, http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify/docs/clarify.html.
85. SPost can be found at J. Scott Long, SPost: Post-estimation with Stata, Mar. 1, 2007,
http://www.indiana.edu/-jslsoc/spost.htm.
86. Zelig can be found at Kosuke Imai, Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software,
http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
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encourage readers of empirical work and editors of legal journals to
play a role as well. Demanding that authors adhere to basic standards
for communicating their data and results will go some distance toward
pushing empirical legal scholarship to new heights.
Along these lines we provide a set of guidelines that build upon
the advice we have offered to authors in this article and in
Communicating I. First and foremost, scholars, editors, policy makers,
judges, and practicing lawyers-that is, all consumers of empirical
work-should press authors to move beyond sterile claims about
statistical significance. When researchers present tables full of
coefficients and asterisks, and make claims about statistical
significance, audience members should push them to provide
quantities of interest. Journal editors should do the same. It is simply
not enough to report statistical significance without conveying
substantive meaning.
Second-and relatedly-editors and consumers should be
highly skeptical of "point estimates" that do not supply sufficient
information on how they were calculated or on the author's
uncertainty about them. We have dwelled enough on the latter point.
But the first is equally important. To see why, reconsider an estimate
we offered earlier, in Figure 12:
Other things being equal, when a nominee is perceived as highl
unqualified the likelihood of a senator casting a yea vote is on y
about 0.27.
Now consider a second claim developed using the same data set and
the same statistical model:
Other things being equal, when a nominee is perceived as highly
unqualified the likelihood of a senator castinga yea vote is 0.56.
How can it be that the odds of a yea vote for a highly
unqualified candidate shift from unlikely (.27) to likely (.56)? The
answer lies with the phrase "other things being equal": in the first
example, the senator and president are of different parties; in the
second, they are both Democrats or both Republicans. Clearly,
senators who share a party affiliation with the president are more
inclined to support his candidates-a fact that the researcher ought
communicate. At the least, readers and editors should compel the
author to explain how he or she developed the given counterfactual so
that they can evaluate its plausibility.
These two suggestions apply to both consumers and editors.
For the latter we have an additional set of recommendations, all
centering on the conditions they should impose on potential
contributors. While editors of legal journals often follow or create style
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guidelines, those we have consulted say next to nothing about the
communication of data and results. 8 7 They should. At a minimum,
editors ought to establish policies governing three areas of the datacommunication process.
First, we, like others before us, 88 implore editors to develop
standards regarding replication.8 9 Indeed, it strikes us as just plain
odd that the law reviews, in particular, are so concerned with
ensuring the availability and providing the exact location of
unpublished papers, 90 which are typically tangential to an article, but
not with data sets, which may be at the article's core. Even if law
review editors are unwilling to adopt a full-blown replication policy,
they should, at the very least, require authors to submit their
databases and the code used to generate the research results. This will
allow someone at or hired by the law journal to review the study and
ensure its replicability. The salutary effects of taking even this small
step would be many, not the least of which would be to help reduce
(though not completely eliminate) concerns about the lack of peer
review in legal scholarship.

87. Communication I, supra note 6, at
88. See Epstein & King, supra note 11, at 132 (recommending law reviews require
documentation and archiving of empirical data that would enable replication).
89. Professor Gary King at Harvard offers the following, easy-to-implement replication
policy for journals:
Authors submitting quantitative papers to this journal for review must
address the issue of data availability and replication in their first footnote.
Authors are ordinarily expected to indicate in this footnote in which public
archive they will deposit the information necessary to replicate their
numerical results, and the date when it will be submitted. The information
deposited should include items such as original data, specialized computer
programs, lists of computer program recodes, extracts of existing data files,
and an explanatory file that describes what is included and explains how to
reproduce the exact numerical results in the published work. Authors may
find the Publication-Related Archive of the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) a convenient place to deposit their
data. Statements explaining the inappropriateness of sharing data for a
specific work (or of the necessity for periods of embargo past the publication
date) may fulfill the requirement ....
Authors of works relying upon
qualitative data should submit a comparable footnote that would facilitate
replication where feasible. As always, authors are advised to remove
information from their datasets that must remain confidential, such as the
names of survey respondents.
Gary King, An Example Replication Policy for Journals, http://gking.harvard.edu/repl.shtml (last
visited Feb. 18, 2007). We should also note that a replication standard such as this is in the best
interest of authors, as it requires them to give a little extra effort at the time of submission to
centrally organize the data and statistical analysis (something that we often wish we would have
done better for our own projects).
90. The ever-present "paper on file with the journal" or "with the author."
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Second, we strongly recommend that editors write out a set of
instructions for the preparation of tables and graphs. Although these
will vary to some extent from journal to journal, many of the rules we
have covered here and in our earlier article are universal. Journals
should adopt guidelines for what constitutes an acceptable table or
figure, and require that authors meet those guidelines. This is
common practice in many social science journals, and one we hope
catches on in the law reviews.
Finally, editors must work with authors to ensure the integrity
of their data presentations. After spending time and energy to produce
high-quality graphical displays, we have been, on occasion, surprised
(read: disappointed) by the published results. It seems that the editors
merely cut and paste graphics files into word processing programs.
Their readers-not to mention authors!-deserve better. Editors
should request graphs in scalable forms, such as Adobe PDF files or
encapsulated postscript files. Then modern software tools should be
used to typeset the graphics in such a way as to maximize their
readability. The advantage of scalable files is that graphics specialists
can resize images without degrading the quality of the presentation.
The days of india ink, photo-ready illustrations may be gone, and the
technology replacing it may be terrific, but it gets us nowhere if we do
not use it.
V. CONCLUSION

We end where we began our series: While law professors are
increasingly making use of data in their scholarship and while the
data work housed in their studies is (generally) of a high quality, these
authors have been less effective at communicating the products of
their labor. A strong devotion to tabular, rather than graphical,
displays, and claims about "statistical significance" rather than
substantive importance, are just two areas requiring improvement.
What we have attempted to do here and in Communication I is
adapt a burgeoning literature in the social and statistical sciences to
the unique interests of legal scholars. Our proposals have been many
in number, but none are particularly difficult to implement. More to
the point, we believe that law professors should want to implement
these suggestions. If other fields are any indication, moving toward
more appropriate and accessible presentations of data will heighten
the impact of empirical legal scholarship regardless of the audienceno doubt a desirable goal in a discipline that rightfully prides itself on
its contributions to the formation of legal and public policy.

